26 "Failed" and "Failing" States: Is Quality of Life Possible?

Richard J. Estes

Introduction

Nation-states (hereafter "nations," "countries," or "states") are internationally autonomous political entities that are bound together by a system of laws, a defined (but not necessarily contiguous) geographic space, and a commitment to the pursuit of the collective well-being of their inhabitants.[1] Though quite diverse in geographic size, population characteristics, type of polity, and economic system, nations share a variety of features common with one another (Britannica Online 2011a; Moran et al. 2006; Weingast and Wittman 2006). Rank ordered more or less in terms of their importance, they include (1) recognition of their political sovereignty by other nations; (2) a coherent set of principles that guide their interactions with other sovereign states; (3) secure physical borders; (4) the administration of justice within a system of laws to which, optimally, the governed have assented (e.g., via a written constitution and an independent judiciary); (5) the provision of a range of "public goods" designed to meet the collective needs of their populations (e.g., the creation of monetary and banking systems, road-building and other transportation networks, the development of communications infrastructure, and the provision of at least limited health, education, and related human services)[2]; (6) special initiatives designed to meet the income security and related needs of their most vulnerable inhabitants (e.g., children, the elderly, persons with chronic illnesses or disabilities, unemployed persons, etc.); and (7) a commitment to promotion of the general well-being of the society-as-a-whole (Kim et al. 2010; Plato 2000; Sachs 2005; Schyns and Koop 2010). In democratic societies, states also carry responsibility for the conduct of fair and open elections and for the promotion of a broad range of civil liberties and political freedoms – all of which are considered necessary elements in the functioning of pluralistic, participatory, societies (Freedom House 2010; Human Rights Watch 2010; Tsai 2006).

[1] The concept of the "nation-state(s)" embraces two distinct components: the "state" or "states" refer to discrete political and geopolitical territories over which the state, acting as a "government," claims sovereignty; "nation" or "nations" refer to the cultural or ethnic characteristics of the people who reside in the state (Britannica Online 2011a). The term "nation-state" implies that the two concepts coincide with one another (i.e., that the people of a given geographic territory share more or less the same cultural, religious, and ethnic characteristics), albeit the vast majority of modern nation-states are characterized by substantial cultural diversity even though their geopolitical borders are fully recognized and accepted by the international community (CIA, 2011). Since the European Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, sovereign nation-states defer to one another as co-equal and autonomous powers with full authority over the territories and people they govern (Britannica Online 2011b). The concept of sovereign nation-states constitutes the basis for membership and voting privileges in the United Nations as well as in most major nongovernmental and non-state actor organizations, i.e., one nation, one vote.

[2] Individual political systems determine the precise role of the state in each of these sectors, i.e., either as facilitators or providers of such functions (Moran et al. 2006; Weingast and Wittman 2006). Overall, the role of the state is to ensure that such functions are performed whether by the private or public sector or through cooperative arrangements with both.

R.J. Estes (✉)
School of Social Policy & Practice (SP2), University of Pennsylvania, 3701 Locust Walk, Philadelphia, PA 19104-6214, USA
e-mail: restes@sp2.upenn.edu

K.C. Land et al. (eds.), *Handbook of Social Indicators and Quality of Life Research*,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-2421-1_26, © Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012

From ancient to modern times, nations also have sought to advance the collective well-being of their citizens through the removal of, or at least reductions in, the obstacles that interfere with the pursuit of progressively higher levels of collective development (Annas 1993; Michalos 2011; UNDP 2010; World Bank 2011). So successful has been the concept of the nation-states in the modern era that their numbers increased from 55 prior to the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian (1867 to October 31, 1918), Ottoman (July 27, 1299, to October 29, 1923), and Russian (1682–1917; 1917–1991) empires to 192 member states of the United Nations in 2010 (United Nations 2011). And the expectation is that more territories will gain political sovereignty over the near term, e.g., the Palestinian territories (from Israel), the Western Sahara (from Spain and Morocco), and, possibly, the Falkland Islands (from the United Kingdom), among others. South Sudan, which voted for separation from the Republic of the Sudan in January 2011, is expected to join the United Nations as a sovereign state in July 2011.

But not all countries are created equal (Bates 2008; Ghani and Lockhart 2008; Tsai et al. 2010), nor are all able to carry out their core functions to the same extent (Chomsky 2006; Estes 2010, 2011a; Kim et al. 2010; Mallaby 2004; Schyns and Koop 2010; Tsai 2007; UNDP 2010; World Bank 2011). Many lack the minimum resources needed to facilitate their development (e.g., Chad, Sierra Leone, the Sudan) while others, even when in possession of critical fiscal and human resources, are trapped in decades-long economic quagmires, civil wars, and unstable political regimes (e.g., the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kampuchea, Tajikistan). As a consequence, per capita income levels in most "failed" and "failing" states (hereafter referred to collectively as either "FSs" or "the FSs") tend to be low by world standards (e.g., Burundi, Laos, Rwanda), and often, they are governed by oppressive and corrupt political regimes (e.g., Haiti, Myanmar, Yemen, Zimbabwe). Intraregional warfare is common among the FSs (e.g., Sierra Leone and Somalia) as is the brutal treatment of their minority populations (e.g., Burundi, Cote d'Ivoire, Iran, and Nigeria).

Indeed, a substantial number of the world's autonomous nations ($N=37$) were classified as either "collapsed," "failed," or "failing" states in 2010 and were placed in an "alert" category by the Fund for Peace and *Foreign Policy* magazine on the basis of the intensity of their collective instability (Fund for Peace 2011a, b, c). These FSs have a combined population of approximately 1,300 million persons, or 18% of the world's total in 2010 (UNPOP 2010). Another 92 countries, including three of the world's most populous nations – China, India, and Indonesia – were grouped by the Fund for Peace in their "warning" category on the basis of (1) dramatically uneven patterns of development (especially in the political sectors [Human Rights Watch 2011]), (2) high levels of public corruption (Transparency International 2010), and (3) troublesome patterns of recurrent diversity-related social conflict (Amnesty International 2010; Freedom House 2010). Countries at the top of the "warning" states list were judged to be at considerable risk of becoming FSs should their current negative socio-political trajectories remain unchanged, e.g., Tajikistan, Mauritania, Laos, and Rwanda (Fund for Peace 2011a).

This chapter examines the relationship that exists between quality of life, political instability, and the capacity of the FSs to satisfy the basic security and material needs of their populations. Particular attention is given to understanding the development outcomes, or their absence, achieved by the FSs in advancing broad-based development goals under conditions of extreme social instability. More specifically, the chapter (1) identifies the world's most socially vulnerable countries using the *Failed States Index* developed jointly by the Fund for Peace and *Foreign Policy* magazine (Fund for Peace 2011a), (2) identifies the extent to which these countries are able to advance their collective development objectives, (3) identifies the major factors that inhibit the pursuit of quality of life in countries experiencing high levels of social turmoil, and (4) suggests alternative approaches that can be taken by the FSs in rebuilding their societies consistent with international norms (Ghani and Lockhart 2008; Rotberg 2004). The chapter also explores the special obligations that are incumbent on more socially advanced countries in helping the FSs strengthen their performance capacities (Europa 2011; Sachs 2008; United Nations 2010a, b, c, d; World Bank 2011).

Methodology

The present study is the thirteenth in a series of analyses of global and regional social development trends. The purpose of all 13 studies has been to (1) identify

significant changes in "adequacy of social provision"[3] of nations throughout the world and (2) assess national and international progress in providing more adequately for the basic social and material needs of the world's growing population. Thus, this chapter reports a time-series analysis of the development performances of 36 "collapsed," "failed," or "failing" states over the 20-year period from 1990 to 2010. Throughout the chapter, data are reported at four levels of analysis: (1) development trends occurring within the FSs vis-à-vis those of other geopolitical groupings of countries, (2) social patterns for the FSs-as-a-group, (3) FSs subgroup socio-political variations, and (4) socio-political trends occurring in each of the 36 FSs.

Study Instruments

Two indexes are used throughout the analysis: (1) the "Failed States Index" (FSI) and (2) the author's extensively pretested "Index of Social Progress" (Estes 2010).

Created in 2005 jointly by the Fund for Peace and *Foreign Policy* magazine, the FSI uses 12 social, economic, and political indicators to assess the capacity of 177 countries to provide for the basic security, political, and material needs of their populations (Table 26.1). Ratings for each indicator are placed on a scale of 0–10, with 0 being the lowest *intensity* (i.e., the most stable) and 10 being the highest intensity (i.e., the least stable). The total FSI score is the sum of the 12 indicator scores with a range in values from 0 (most favorable) to 120 (least favorable). In 2010, FSI scores ranged from 18.7 and 19.3 for Norway and Finland (both politically stable and socially advanced countries) to 114.3 and 113.3 for Somalia and Chad (both deeply impoverished countries characterized by unstable political regimes and high levels of diversity-related social conflict). FSI scores are used to rank order the Fund's 177 countries into four broad categories that reflect the intensity of their level of socio-political instability: (1) "alert" ($N=37$), (2) "warning" ($N=92$), (3) "moderate" ($N=35$), or (4) "sustainable" ($N=13$).

[3] "Adequacy of social provision" refers to the changing capacity of governments to provide for the basic social, material, and other needs of the people living within their borders, e.g., for food, clothing, shelter, and access to at least basic health, education, and social services, etc. (Estes 1988).

Table 26.1 The failed states index (FSI)

Social indicators	
1	Mounting demographic pressures
2	Massive movement of refugees or internally displaced persons creating complex humanitarian emergencies
3	Legacy of vengeance-seeking group grievance or group paranoia
4	Chronic and sustained human flight
Economic indicators	
5	Uneven economic development along group lines
6	Sharp and/or severe economic decline
Political indicators	
7	Criminalization and/or delegitimization of the state
8	Progressive deterioration of public services
9	Suspension or arbitrary application of the rule of law and widespread violation of human rights
10	Security apparatus operates as a "state within a state"
11	Rise of factionalized elites
12	Intervention of other states or external political actors

Source: Fund for Peace (2011a)

Excluding only the recently independent Timor-Leste (2002), the current study's group of 36 "failed" and "failing" nation-states fall within the FSI's "alert" category of conflict-ridden nations, i.e., countries that because of their highly unstable and deteriorating social conditions are unable to participate fully in the community of nations (Chomsky 2006; Rotberg 2003; Van de Walle 2004; Zartman 1995). Twenty-two of these countries are located in Sub-Saharan Africa, 13 in Central and Western Asia, and one, Haiti, in Latin America.

In its present form, the ISP, and its statistically weighted version, the WISP,[4] consist of 41 social indicators subdivided into 10 subindexes (Table 26.1): *Education* ($N=4$), *Health Status* ($N=7$), *Women Status* ($N=5$), *Defense Effort* ($N=1$), *Economic* ($N=5$), *Demographic* ($N=3$), *Environmental* ($N=3$), *Social Chaos* ($N=5$), *Cultural Diversity* ($N=3$), and *Welfare Effort* ($N=5$). Composite index and subindex scores

[4] The WISP's statistical weights were derived through a two-stage principal components and varimax factor analysis in which indicator and subindex scores were analyzed separately for their contribution in explaining the variance associated with changes in social progress over time. Standardized indicator scores were multiplied by their respective factor loadings, averaged within their subindex, and the average subindex scores, in turn, were subjected to a second statistical weighting. Scores on the WISP range from a high of 72 to a low of 17 for 2010 (Estes 2010).

Table 26.2 Indicators on the weighted index of social progress (WISP) by subindex, 2010 (41 indicators and 10 subindexes)

Subindex indicators
Education subindex (*N* = 4)
Public expenditure on education as percentage of GDP, 2008–2009 (+)
Primary school completion rate, 2008–2009 (+)
Secondary school net enrolment rate, 2008–2009 (+)
Adult literacy rate, 2008 (+)
Health status subindex (*N* = 6)
Life expectation at birth, 2008 (+)
Infant mortality rate, 2008–2009 (–)
Under-five child mortality rate, 2008 (–)
Physicians per 100,000 population, 2005–2008 (+)
Percent of undernourished population, 2006–2008 (–)
Public expenditure on health as percentage of Gross Domestic Product, 2008–2009 (+)
Women status subindex (*N* = 5)
Female adult literacy as percentage of male literacy, 2009 (+)
Prevalence of contraceptive use among married women, 2008 (+)
Lifetime risk of maternal death, 2005 (+)
Female secondary school enrollment as percentage of male enrolment, 2008 (+)
Seats in parliament held by women as percentage of total, 2010 (+)
Defense effort subindex (*N* = 1)
Military expenditures as percentage of GDP, 2009 (–)
Economic subindex (*N* = 5)
Per capita Gross Domestic Product (as measured by PPP), 2009 (+)
Percent growth in Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 2009 (+)
Unemployment rate, 2006–08 (–)
Total external debt as percentage of GNI, 2009 (–)
Gini index score, most recent year 2005–09 (–)
Demography subindex (*N* = 3)
Average annual rate of population growth, 2009 (–)
Percent of population aged <15 years, 2009 (–)
Percent of population aged >64 years, 2009 (+)
Environmental subindex (*N* = 3)
Percentage of nationally protected area, 2004–2008 (+)
Average annual number of disaster-related deaths, 2000–2009 (–)
Per capita metric tons of carbon dioxide emissions, 2007 (–)
Social Chaos subindex (*N* = 6)
Strength of political rights, 2010 (–)
Strength of civil liberties, 2010 (–)
Number of internally displaced persons per 100,000 population, 2009 (–)
Number of externally displaced persons per 100,000 population, 2009 (–)
Estimated number of deaths from armed conflicts (low estimate), 2006–2007 (–)
Perceived corruption index, 2009 (+)
Cultural diversity subindex (*N* = 3)
Largest percentage of population sharing the same or similar racial/ethnic origins, 2009 (+)
Largest percentage of population sharing the same or similar religious beliefs, 2009 (+)
Largest share of population sharing the same mother tongue, 2009 (+)
Welfare effort subindex (*N* = 5)
Age First National Law – Old Age, Invalidity and Death, 2010 (+)
Age First National Law – Sickness and Maternity, 2010 (+)
Age First National Law – Work Injury, 2010 (+)
Age First National Law – Unemployment, 2010 (+)
Age First National Law – Family Allowance, 2010 (+)

Source: Estes (2010)

on the ISP and WISP are used to assess the extent of state failure vis-à-vis the satisfaction of basic human needs (Table 26.2).

Thus, for purposes of this study, the FSI is treated as a taxonomy that is used to classify countries by their level of socio-political instability whereas the WISP is used to assess the depth of that instability using a wide range of social indicators. Owing to the volume of data gathered for this analysis, only statistically weighted Index of Social Progress (WISP) scores and scores on the WISP's ten subindexes (world average = 10.0, *SD* = 1.0) are reported in this chapter.

Data Sources

The majority of the data used in this analysis were obtained from the annual reports of specialized agencies of the United Nations, the United Nations Development Programme, the World Bank, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and the International Social Security Association. Data for the *Environmental* subindex were obtained from the World Resources Institute, the United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development, and the World Bank. Data for the *Social Chaos* subindex were obtained from Amnesty International, Freedom House, Human Rights Watch, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, the Stockholm International Peace and Research Institute, and Transparency International.

Data for the *Cultural Diversity* subindex were gathered from the *CIA World Factbook*, the *Encyclopedia Britannica,* and the work of independent scholars in the fields of comparative linguistics, religion, and ethnology. The formal social welfare programs data were obtained from policy reports prepared by the International Social Security Association and the U.S. Social Security Administration.

Data for the FSI were prepared jointly by the U.S. think tank, the Fund for Peace, and *Foreign Policy* magazine (formerly a publication of the Carnegie Endowment for Peace). Data for the FSI were collected by means of CAST software which electronically searches tens of thousands national and international publications monthly for changes occurring in national social, political, and economic conditions. The data obtained from these searches are used to assign destabilization "intensity" scores for the FSI's 12 component indicators (Fund for Peace 2011b, c).

Time Periods

FSI data are reported for 2010 only and, then, for the purpose of identifying nation-states that fall within the "failed" and "failing" states categories. WISP index and subindex findings, on the other hand, are reported separately for three discrete time periods, i.e., 1990, 2000, and 2010. In addition to the WISP data, supplemental social indicator data for the study's 36 countries are summarized in Tables 26.4–26.8. Figures 26.1–26.6 provide world and group WISP indicator data ranked by 2010 polity failure level for all 36 countries.

Findings

The study's findings are reported in four parts. Part 1 discusses the nature of state failure and identifies the 36 "failed" states included in this analysis. The geographic location of these states is identified in Table 26.3 as are several critical factors that contribute to the inability of the FSs to reverse their current negative development trends, e.g., being land-locked ($N=11$), being poor countries that are heavily in debt to the international community ($N=17$), being classified by the United Nations as "Least Developing Countries" ($N=22$), or all three ($N=7$). Part 1 also reports 2010 WISP index and WISP rank data (Fig. 26.1) for the 36 countries-as-a-group and, in turn, for the FSs by major continental and subcontinental grouping (Figs. 26.2 and 26.3). Figure 26.4 reports WISP subindex scores separately for "failed" ($N=15$) and "failing" states ($N=21$) for the year 2010, i.e., the same base year for which scores on the *Failed States Index* are reported.

Part 2 identifies the major elements of state failure and reports selected population (Table 26.4), economic (Table 26.5), and political (Table 26.6) indicators for all 36 countries using selected social indicators drawn from the Weighted Index of Social Progress (Table 26.2). Patterns of central government expenditures are summarized in the data reported in Table 26.7. Table 26.8 reports WISP scores values and change in WISP rank positions for 1990, 2000, and 2010.

Part 3 contrasts development trends occurring in the 36 FSs with those of other major aggregations of countries (Figs. 26.5 and 26.6) for the years 1990, 2000, and 2010, i.e., for *Developed Market Economies* (DME, $N=34$), the *Commonwealth of Independent States* (CIS, $N=19$), "*Developing Countries*" (DC, $N=54$), and socially "*Least Developing*," but not necessarily failed or failing, countries (LDCs, $N=19$).[5] In earlier studies using the WISP, the FSs were grouped with the DCs ($N=12$) and LDCs ($N=22$) with the exception of Georgia and Uzbekistan which were classified with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The average WISP scores reported in Figs. 26.5 and 26.6 adjust for the re-designation of the 36 FSs into their own category. The impact of this reclassification resulted in

[5] The four primary groupings used in the more comprehensive analysis of world social development trends are (1) *Developed Market Economies* (DMEs) consisting primarily of economically advanced countries (plus selected middle-income countries added to the Organizations of Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD] on the basis of their current rapid pace of economic development, e.g., the Czech Republic, Mexico, South Korea, Turkey); (2) the *Commonwealth of Independent States* (CIS) consisting entirely of successor states to the former Soviet Union (FSU); (3) *Developing Countries* (DCs) consisting primarily of low- and middle-income countries located in developing Africa, Asia, and Latin America; and (4) *Least Developed Countries* (LDCs) which, for a variety of historical and socio-political reasons, experience net negative patterns of socio-economic development from one time period to another (UN-OHRLLS 2009a, b, c, d).

Table 26.3 Selected characteristics of failed or failing states organized by major geographic region and subregion, 2010 ($N=36$)

Continent Subregion	Country	LDC[a]	Land locked	HIPC[b]	Total	Type of state
AFRICA (*N*=22)						
East (*N*=7)	Burundi	X	X	0	2	Failing
	Eritrea	X	0	0	1	Failing
	Ethiopia	X	X	X	3	Failing
	Kenya	0	0	0	0	Failed
	Malawi	X	X	X	3	Failing
	Somalia	X	0	0	1	Failed
	Uganda	X	X	X	3	Failing
Middle (*N*=5)	Cameroon	0	0	X	1	Failing
	Central African Rep	X	0	X	2	Failed
	Chad	X	X	X	3	Failed
	Congo, Demo Rep	X	0	X	2	Failed
	Congo, Rep	0	0	X	1	Failing
North (*N*=1)	Sudan	X	0	0	1	Failed
South (*N*=1)	Zimbabwe	0	X	0	1	Failed
West (*N*=8)	Burkina Faso	X	X	X	3	Failing
	Cote D'Ivoire	0	0	X	1	Failed
	Guinea	X	0	X	2	Failed
	Guinea-Bissau	X	0	X	2	Failing
	Liberia	X	0	X	2	Failing
	Niger	X	X	X	3	Failing
	Nigeria	0	0	0	0	Failed
	Sierra Leone	X	0	X	2	Failing
ASIA (N=13)						
Central (*N*=7)	Afghanistan	X	X	X	3	Failed
	Bangladesh	X	0	0	1	Failing
	Iran	0	0	0	0	Failing
	Nepal	X	X	0	2	Failing
	Pakistan	0	0	0	0	Failed
	Sri Lanka	0	0	0	0	Failing
	Uzbekistan	0	X	0	1	Failing
West (*N*=4)	Iraq	0	0	0	0	Failed
	Georgia	0	0	0	0	Failing
	Lebanon	0	0	0	0	Failing
	Yemen	X	0	0	1	Failed
South East (*N*=1)	Myanmar (Burma)	X	0	0	1	Failing
East (*N*=1)	Korea, North	0	0	0	0	Failing
LATIN AMERICA (*N*=1)						
Caribbean (*N*=1)	Haiti	X	0	X	2	Failed
Total		22	11	17	50	Failed & Failing

Sources: UN-OHRLS (2009a, b, c); IMP (2010)
[a]*LDC* Least Developing Country
[b]*HIPC* Heavily Indebted Poor Country

slight increases in average WISP scores for the CIS (from a group average WISP score of 54.1 with the FSs to a group average of 54.4 *without* the FSs), DCs (from a group average WISP score of 47.4 with the FSs to a group average of 49.2 *without* the FSs), and the LDCs not classified as FSs (from a group WISP score average of 35.4 with the FSs to a group average of 38.6 *without* the FSs).

Part 4 suggests a range of proactive steps that can be taken by the FSs themselves *and* the international community in helping FSs reverse their current pattern of negative social development. The proposed actions are intended to promote a more positive outcome for the future of the FSs, i.e., outcomes not unlike those achieved by South Africa following the end of apartheid or the countries of Central and Eastern Europe once they were free of Soviet domination.

Part 1: The Nature of State Failure

The word "failure" refers to "the nonperformance of something due, required, or expected" (Dictionary.com). The concept can be applied to any unit of analysis (e.g., individuals, groups, organizations, or to larger aggregations such as countries or civilizations). For our purposes, the concept will be applied to the failure of individual countries in satisfying the most basic security and material needs of their populations.

When applied to countries, "failure" is used to describe the lack of state performance in meeting essential obligations toward their inhabitants and, in turn, toward the larger community of nations (Bates 2008; Clapham 2004). Among others, state failures include (1) the loss of recognition of state sovereignty by the international community (Carment 2004; Chomsky 2006); (2) the inability to maintain secure geographic borders (Ghani and Lockhart 2008); (3) the persistence of internal, intraregional, and international warfare (Huntington 1996); (4) the inability to operate stable monetary or other essential economic institutions (IMF 2010a, b); (5) the absence of transparent legal and justice systems (Klare 2004; Rose-Ackerman 2004); (6) high levels of public corruption (Transparency International 2010); (7) the inability to exploit available natural and human resources (UNIFEM 2010; WRI 2008); (8) the inability to control, or at least reduce, internal diversity-related social conflict (SIPRI 2009); (9) lack of respect on the part of the state for individual freedoms and liberties (Freedom House 2010; Human Rights Watch 2011); (10) the failure to create political space in which people can participate actively in the making of the laws and policies by which they agree to be governed (Kasfir 2004; Lyons 2004); (11) the absence of a viable civil society sector (Anheier et al. 2010); (12) chronic dependency on foreign aid and other external support sources to meet basic needs (Glennie 2008; Mallaby 2004; Moyo 2009); and (13) the state's inability, perhaps unwillingness, to provide for the special needs of their most vulnerable populations, e.g., children, the aged, persons with severe illnesses and disabilities, etc. (Save the Children 2010; UNICEF 2010a, b).

Thus, countries fail "…when they are consumed by internal violence and cease delivering positive goods to their inhabitants" (Rotberg 2004:1). These failures can be quite profound (as with Afghanistan, Iraq, North Korea, and Zimbabwe) but, more typically, occur in a just a few critical sectors, e.g., Burundi, Iran, Sierra Leone.

State failures can be conceptualized as existing along a continuum of success and failure on which weaker states are located at one end of the spectrum and are described as "collapsed," "failed," or "failing," and stronger states are located at the other end of the spectrum and are conceptualized as being either "moderate" or "sustainable" vis-à-vis their capacity to perform expected state functions. This more relativistic view of state failure is that taken by Bates (2008), Chomsky (2006), Clapham (2004), Rotberg (2004), van de Walle (2004), and also by the Fund for Peace (2011a).

However, this perspective differs sharply from that expressed by Huntington (1996) and others, including the Club of Rome (2011), concerning their often dire predictions of the prognosis of the failure of entire civilizations in response to cultural and other assaults against the integrity of the nation-state.[6]

"Failed" and "Failing" States

Table 26.3 identifies the study's 36 "failed" and "failing" states (FSs) by their major continental and subcontinental groupings, i.e., Africa = 22, Asia = 13, Latin America = 1. The majority of African FSs are located

[6] In his 1996 book *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, Huntington identified clashes among the following civilizations that could be expected to dominate political affairs in much of the twenty-first century: (1) Western, (2) Latin America, (3) Islamic, (4) Sinic (Chinese), (5) Hindu, (6) Orthodox, (7) Japanese, and (8) African. The clashes are expected to take many forms ranging from cultural disintegration to military confrontations, but in the end, each would profoundly alter the character of the nations engaged in the conflicts and, in the process, change the course of future world history.

in the continent's Eastern ($N=7$) and Western ($N=8$) subregions whereas the majority of Asian FSs are located in Asia's Central ($N=7$) and Western ($N=4$) subregions. Twenty of the 22 African FSs are located in the continent's Sub-Saharan region, long regarded as the poorest and most socially vulnerable region in the world (UNDP 2010).

Table 26.3 also identifies several additional factors associated with country status as a failed or failing state, i.e., 22 of the 36 FSs are officially classified by the United Nations as "Least Developing Countries" (LDCs), 11 are land-locked states (of which 9 are also LDCs), and 17 are "heavily indebted poor countries" of which 14 are LDCs, 7 are both land-locked and LDCs, i.e., Ethiopia, Malawi, Uganda, Chad, Burkina Faso, Niger, Afghanistan (UN-OHRLLS 2009a, b, c, d). Thus, a majority of the study's FSs are trapped in geographic spaces with limited natural resources and transportation networks that seriously impede their capacity for more autonomous development. The presence of high debt levels among so many of the FSs reflects decades of public borrowing (mostly from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund) to fund large-scale projects whose benefits have yet to be realized, i.e., major dams and hydroelectric projects, road-building projects, the introduction of market reforms, among others (International Monetary Fund 2010b). High levels of public indebtedness often are associated with these projects as is public corruption including the outright theft by high-ranking officials of a large portion of the borrowed funds (Transparency International 2010).

Cash poor and geographically trapped, many of the FSs develop authoritarian regimes for the purpose of limiting public criticisms of their incompetence, e.g., Democratic Republic of the Congo, Iran, North Korea, Yemen. The situation is worse in countries still struggling with post-colonial legacies (i.e., Guinea-Bissau, Georgia, Libya, Uzbekistan, Zimbabwe) and in those characterized by decades-long diversity-related social conflicts (e.g., Chad, Iraq, Myanmar, Sudan). In none of these situations is overt public dissent tolerated; rather, political oppression is more the norm, e.g., Afghanistan, Central African Republic, Cote d'Ivoire (Human Rights Watch 2010). In the end, though, the populations of these nations suffer dramatically while, at the same time, scarce national resources are allocated to officially promulgated persecution campaigns, e.g., Burundi, Eritrea, Haiti, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, Uganda (African Development Bank 2010; Asian Development Bank 2010; Leonard and Straus 2003; Obioma 2001; Widner 2004).

Failed States and Scores on the Weighted Index of Social Progress (WISP)

Figure 26.1 summarizes WISP scores (which in 2010 ranged from 17 [least favorable] to 73 [most favorable]) and ranks for the 36 FSs on both the WISP and *Failed States Indexes* (for which higher scores indicate higher levels of intensity of state failure).

Figure 26.1 shows a pattern of general consistency between the two scores, albeit the comparative ranks for particular countries vary from one scale to another, e.g., Afghanistan and Chad are among the lowest ranked countries on both metrics, but the WISP assigns somewhat higher rankings for the Sudan, Zimbabwe, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo than does the FSI. However, both scales place these countries in the "failed states" category. As expected, the Pearson correlation coefficient for both metrics is quite high ($r=-.60$, $P<.01$).

Also of interest in Fig. 26.1 is the highly erratic pattern of WISP score rankings for the 36 FSs. This pattern is unusual among clusters of related nations and reflects the asymmetrical nature of development within the FSs, i.e., situations in which even minor progress in some areas are offset by major losses in others. Nearly all of the WISP ranks reported place the 36 FSs in the bottom sixth and seventh percentiles of WISP ranks; however, Lebanon, Uzbekistan, and Georgia attained WISP ranks higher than 68, i.e., ranks that placed them in the third or fourth WISP percentile of 161 countries. And these also are countries that the Fund for Peace identifies as existing along the margins of the FSI, i.e., between "failed" and "moderately" performing states.

WISP Score Averages for Africa by Subregion

Figure 26.2 summarizes WISP score data for each of Africa's five major subregions for the years 2000 and 2010, i.e., Eastern ($N=7$), Middle ($N=5$), Northern ($N=1$), Southern ($N=1$), and Western ($N=8$) subregions. Data also are reported for all FSs located in Africa ($N=22$).



Fig. 26.1 Rank ordered WISP scores for failed and failing states ($N=36/161$), 2010



Fig. 26.2 Average WISP scores for failed and failing states for Africa by subregion ($N=22$), 2000 and 2010

In every instance, WISP scores are considerably higher for Africa and its subregions for 2010 than in 2000. The pattern of these scores tells three stories: (1) Africa continues to be the world’s socially least developed continent, however, even with her higher WISP score averages in 2010; (2) following decades of chronic social decline, African development is now moving forward…and doing so at a comparatively rapid pace; and (3) recent improvements in African development are associated with reforms undertaken by African nations with the assistance of major bilateral aid-granting initiatives originating in Europe, Japan, and the United States



Fig. 26.3 Average WISP scores for failed and failing states for Asia by subregion (*N* = 13), 2000 and 2010

as well as through multilateral development assistance provided by the United Nations Millennium Development Campaign (MDC). The countries with the most extensive natural and human resources – located primarily in Northern and Southern Africa – contain the fewest "failed" states (*N* = 1 each), whereas those with the lowest concentrations of resources contain the largest number of FSs – Eastern (*N* = 7), Middle (*N* = 5), and Western (*N* = 8) Africa. But for the continent-as-a-whole, comparative success with social development is finally taking root in Africa-as-a-continent (Estes 2011a), albeit many of her vulnerable countries located in her Middle and Central subregions remain classified as "failed" or "failing" states, e.g., Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cote d'Ivoire, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Uganda.

The generally negative situation that exists for Africa's most fractious states and subregions could change for the better should the continent-as-a-whole continue to integrate more fully the net social gains reflected in Fig. 26.2.

WISP Score Averages for Asia by Subregion

The majority of the world's population resides in Asia, i.e., somewhat more than 60% of the world's total in 2010 (UNPOP 2010). Not surprisingly, Asia is the location of three of the world's four most populous nations – China, India, and Indonesia – as well as many of the planet's most religiously, ethnically, and culturally diverse societies. Despite its geographic size and complex cultural mix, only 13 of the continent's 54 nations are classified as "failed" or "failing" states by the Fund for Peace (2011a). As reported in Table 26.3, the majority of Asian FSs are located in its newly independent South Central (*N* = 7) and war-ridden Western (*N* = 4) subregions; only two are located in the continent's Eastern (North Korea) and South Eastern (Myanmar) subregions.

The WISP data reported in Fig. 26.3 for Asia indicate a substantially higher level of social development for Asia (2010 group average = 41.8) than for Africa (2010 group average = 34.9). And Asia's subregions, on average, have enjoyed higher levels of social development for a longer time period than have Africa's due, in part, to (1) their longer years of political independence; (2) varied and rich natural and human resources; (3) extensive intranational and global transportation networks; (4) in recent years at least, comparatively fewer contemporary civil wars and insurgency movements; (5) a greater commitment to individual freedoms and civil liberties; and (6) Asia's recently emerging role as the world's manufacturing center (Estes 2007, 2011b).

As is the situation among African FSs (Estes 1995), Asia's FSs are characterized by comparatively low levels of political participation. The region's FSs also



	Educ	Hlth	Wom	Def	Econ	Pop	Env	Chaos	Cul	Wel
Failed	9.0	2.4	5.0	10.0	8.4	7.1	10.1	3.0	8.0	7.1
Failing	9.6	5.8	7.4	9.5	9.3	8.1	9.8	7.8	8.9	7.6

Fig. 26.4 Average WISP subindex scores for failed and failing states ($N = 36$), 2010

experience sharp fluctuations in the stability of their export-oriented economies, a situation compounded by their nearly equal dependency on the importation of large quantities of raw materials needed to sustain their export economies (e.g., of energy sources, steel, and raw materials).

Unfortunately for Asia, among their major exports are large numbers of well-educated young people who leave their countries of origin in search of improved economic opportunities elsewhere (UNHCR 2009a, b). The region also is home to a disproportionate number of the world’s internally displaced persons – many who were forced to abandon their homelands due to civil strife or ethnic conflicts (UNHCR 2009a). Of significance, too, is the high level of official development assistance on which many of the Asian FSs depend to meet their basic security and material needs (World Bank 2009).

Political corruption, widespread thefts of public resources, and weak economic infrastructures combine with the absence of rational legal systems and functioning commercial environments to dissuade many international corporations from engaging in commercial exchanges with Asian FSs. The situation is especially problematic in the FSs of South Central Asia which only recently emerged from domination by the former Soviet Union and those of West Asia which hold onto religious fundamentalism and the vestiges of ethnic discrimination as guideposts for the development of their nations.

Despite their development challenges, the prognosis for Asia’s “failed” states is generally favorable given the strength of their 2010 development performances on the WISP. East, South Central, and West Asia are expected to advance more quickly than the Southeastern subregion, but Asia’s Southeastern subregion already has attained a remarkably high level of development progress since 1990 (ADB 2010; Estes 2010).

Failed States Average Subindex Scores on the WISP

Figure 26.4 reports the sectoral social development performances for both “failed” and “failing” states. With the exception of scores on the *Defense Effort* and *Environmental* subindexes group performances on the WISPs, eight other subindexes are more favorable for the “failing” states than for already “failed” states. Virtually all of the subindex scores for both groups of nations, however, are well below the world average of 10.0 set for each subindex and, in the case of “failed” states, are substantially below the world averages, e.g., 2.4, 3.0, and 5.0 on the *Health, Social Chaos,* and *Women Status* subindexes, respectively. In general, there is no “good news” in any of the subindex scores reported here for either group of FSs, albeit the scores for both groups were universally higher in 2010 than in 2000. Even with the present 10-year advances in

WISP index and subindex performances, none of the composite scores were sufficiently high as to bring about a reclassification of any nation from the FSs category.

Part 2: Selected Demographic, Economic, Political, and Central Government Expenditure Patterns of "Failed" and "Failing" States

Demographic Characteristics

The 36 "failed" and "failing" states included in this analysis have a combined population of more than 1,300 million people – 18% of the world's total in 2010 (UNPOP 2010). As reported in Table 26.4, the average size of "failed" states is larger (41.8 million) than that of "failing" states (28.6 million), but both clusters of nations include countries with populations approaching or exceeding 150 million persons, e.g., Pakistan ($N=176$ million), Bangladesh ($N=156$ million), and Nigeria ($N=149$ million).

"Failed" and "failing" states also are characterized by comparatively youthful populations. Forty-two percent of the populations of "failed" states are younger than 15 years of age, and 36% of the populations of "failing" states are younger, on average, than 15 years of age. Niger, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda, Afghanistan, Somalia, Nigeria, the Cameroons, and Burkina Faso are among the world's most youthful (and least educated) nations due, in no small measure, to decades-long warfare in these countries which resulted in the premature deaths of young men and women in their 20s, 30s, and 40s. Both sets of countries contain very small percentages of persons aged 65 years of age and older, i.e., 3.3% of the "failed" states and 4.5% of the "failing" states. These data contrast sharply with those for the world-as-a-whole ($N=161$) which has a youth population averaging 29% and an aged population averaging 8%.

Thus, shorter life expectation combined with high mortality rates is a dominant feature of life in the FSs. This pattern is reinforced by higher rates of infant and child mortality, higher incidences of infectious and communicable diseases, and lower levels of adult literacy (Table 26.4). Along all of these dimensions, the study's FSs perform more poorly than the world on average and certainly well below comparable patterns reported for the world's most socially advanced countries (Estes 2010).

Economic Characteristics

The overwhelmingly negative situation of the FSs vis-à-vis the world-as-a-whole is further compounded by the highly negative economic data reported for the FSs in Table 26.5. In comparison with world economic performances, "failed" and "failing" states performed at lower levels in terms of the size of their national economies, rates of economic growth, their extraordinarily high levels of external public indebtedness, high unemployment rates (with many exceeding 30 or more percent), and inequitable patterns of wealth distribution.

The situation is only somewhat better in the "failing" states than in those that already have collapsed, e.g., higher per capita income levels and Gini coefficients in a small number of "failing" states, e.g., Lebanon ($13,000) and Iran ($12,000), and more favorable Gini coefficients for Ethiopia (.30), Bangladesh (.33), North Korea (.37), Myanmar (.39), and Malawi (.39). The majority of "failed" and "failing" states were unable to compete with the economic development performances of the world-as-a-whole, a reality that keeps most of these nations trapped in a quagmire of social and economic poverty (Rotberg 2003; Sachs 2005; Sen 1999; United Nations 2010b; UNDP 2010; WRI 2008). Even so, and on virtually every economic indicator, average economic scores are more favorable for "failing" than "failed" states.

Political Characteristics

Responsibility for the highly negative social and economic profiles of the FSs is explained by the political data summarized in Table 26.6. Along virtually every indicator reported in the table, both "failed" and "failing" states performed at substantially lower levels than the world-as-a-whole. Scores on the *Political Freedom* and *Civil Liberties* indexes (Freedom House 2010), for example, are among the worst reported in the author's more comprehensive analysis of worldwide social development trends (Estes 2010), as are scores on the *Global Corruption Perceptions Index* and the *Global Corruption Barometer* (Transparency International 2010). The percentage of seats held by women in the parliaments of

Table 26.4 Selected population-related indicators for failed and failing states rank ordered by failed state index scores, 2010 (*N*=36)

Countries	Population (Millions) 2009	Population growth rate 2009	Age dependent population <15 years 2009	Age dependent population >65 years 2009	Life expectation at birth 2008	Infant mortality 2008–2009	Adult literacy rate 2008
Failed states (N=15)							
Somalia	9.8	3.2	45.0	2.7	49.8	108.5	38.0
Chad	10.3	3.3	46.0	2.8	48.7	124.0	32.7
Sudan	41.1	2.0	39.0	3.6	58.1	69.3	69.3
Zimbabwe	11.4	0.6	39.0	4.1	44.2	56.3	91.4
Congo, Dem Rep	68.7	2.8	46.0	2.6	47.6	125.8	66.6
Afghanistan	33.6	4.5	46.0	2.2	43.9	133.7	28.0
Iraq	28.9	2.7	41.0	3.3	67.9	35.4	77.6
Central African Rep	4.5	1.3	40.0	3.9	47.0	112.0	54.6
Guinea	1.5	1.9	43.0	3.3	57.8	87.8	38.0
Pakistan	176.2	2.4	37.0	4.0	66.5	70.5	53.7
Haiti	9.0	1.4	36.0	4.4	61.2	63.7	53.0
Cote D’Ivoire	20.6	1.6	40.0	3.9	57.4	83.1	54.6
Kenya	39.0	2.3	43.0	2.6	54.2	54.8	86.5
Nigeria	149.2	2.5	42.0	3.1	47.9	85.8	60.1
Afghanistan	23.8	3.1	43.0	2.4	62.9	50.8	60.9
Subgroup averages	*41.8*	*2.4*	*41.7*	*3.3*	*54.3*	*84.1*	*57.7*
Failing states (N=21)							
Myanmar (Burma)	48.1	1.1	27.0	5.5	61.6	53.8	91.9
Ethiopia	85.2	2.0	43.0	3.2	55.2	67.1	35.9
Korea, North	22.7	0.5	21.0	9.6	67.2	26.4	100.0
Niger	15.3	3.4	50.0	2.0	51.4	75.7	29.0
Uganda	32.4	3.4	49.0	2.5	52.7	79.4	74.6
Guinea -Bissau	10.1	3.0	43.0	3.5	47.8	115.2	51.0
Burundi	9.0	3.1	38.0	2.8	50.4	101.3	65.9
Bangladesh	156.1	1.9	31.0	3.9	66.1	41.2	55.0
Sri Lanka	21.3	0.4	24.0	7.5	74.1	12.7	90.6
Nepal	28.6	2.1	36.0	4.0	66.7	38.6	57.9
Cameroon	18.9	1.9	41.0	3.6	51.1	94.6	75.9
Malawi	14.3	2.2	46.0	3.1	53.1	68.8	72.8
Sierra Leone	6.4	3.7	43.0	1.8	47.6	122.8	39.8
Eritrea	5.6	4.1	42.0	2.5	59.5	39.1	65.3
Congo, Rep	4.0	3.0	40.0	3.8	53.6	80.5	85.0
Iran	66.4	1.4	24.0	4.9	71.4	25.9	82.0
Liberia	3.4	1.6	42.0	3.1	58.3	79.9	58.1
Lebanon	4.0	1.2	25.0	7.3	72.0	11.1	87.0
Burkina Faso	15.7	3.1	46.0	2.0	53.0	90.8	24.0
Uzbekistan	27.6	1.2	29.0	4.5	67.8	31.8	99.2
Georgia	4.6	−1.0	17.0	14.3	71.5	26.0	99.7
Subgroup averages	*28.6*	*2.1*	*36.0*	*4.5*	*59.6*	*61.1*	*68.6*
Total (N=36)	*1,227.3*						
Group averages (N=36)	*34.1*	*2.2*	*38.4*	*4.0*	*57.4*	*70.7*	*64.0*
SD (N=36)	*43.5*	*1.1*	*8.3*	*2.4*	*8.8*	*33.9*	*22.0*
World averages (N=161)	*6,800.0*	*1.4*	*28.9*	*7.6*	*67.9*	*34.3*	*82.7*

Data Sources: United Nations Development Programme (2010); World Bank (2010)

Table 26.5 Selected economic indicators for failed and failing states rank ordered by failed states index, 2010 ($N=36$)

Countries	PC GDP (PPP) 2009[a]	% growth GDP 2009[a]	External debt as % GDP 2009[a]	Unemployment rate 2011[b]	GINI coefficient (varied)
Failed states ($N=15$)					
Somalia	$600	2.6	14.7	47.4	42.7
Chad	$1,347	1.6	27.0	10.0	47.0
Sudan	$2,201	4.0	105.1	4.0	36.4
Zimbabwe	$200	–2.4	282.6	6.0	50.1
Congo, Dem Rep	$320	2.7	100.0	10.0	47.0
Afghanistan	$700	2.3	23.0	3.8	35.2
Iraq	$3,553	4.2	76.0	30.0	36.0
Central African Rep	$759	2.4	68.0	8.0	61.3
Guinea-Bissau	$1,100	4.7	70.0	46.5	38.6
Pakistan	$2,625	3.7	31.0	5.1	30.6
Haiti	$1,153	2.9	7.0	60.0	59.2
Cote D'Ivoire	$1,707	3.8	54.0	11.4	44.6
Kenya	$1,572	2.2	24.0	40.0	42.5
Nigeria	$2,150	2.9	6.0	2.9	43.7
Yemen	$2,473	3.8	25.0	11.5	33.4
Subgroup average	*$1,497*	*2.8*	*60.9*	*19.8*	*43.2*
Failing states ($N=21$)					
Myanmar (Burma)	$1,200	6.6	27.0	5.0	38.7
Ethiopia	$936	8.7	13.0	5.0	30.0
Korea, North	$1,800	3.7	6.1	4.4	36.8
Niger	$676	1.0	79.0	2.8	50.5
Uganda	$1,219	7.1	13.0	3.2	45.7
Guinea	$600	3.3	203.0	46.5	47.0
Burundi	$393	3.5	202.0	14.0	42.4
Bangladesh	$1,420	5.9	25.0	4.3	33.4
Sri Lanka	$4,779	3.5	85.8	5.2	40.2
Nepal	$1,156	4.7	36.0	1.8	47.2
Cameroon	$2,228	2.4	13.0	7.5	44.6
Malawi	$859	7.7	24.0	1.1	39.0
Sierra Leone	$809	4.0	163.0	50.0	62.9
Eritrea	$700	2.0	44.0	25.0	42.7
Congo, Rep	$4,248	7.6	155.0	25.5	47.0
Iran	$11,575	1.8	6.0	10.5	43.0
Liberia	$397	4.6	606.0	85.0	52.6
Lebanon	$12,962	8.0	154.8	12.5	36.0
Burkina Faso	$1,189	3.5	23.0	8.1	39.5
Uzbekistan	$2,879	8.1	11.0	0.7	36.8
Georgia	$4,778	–4.0	31.0	13.3	40.4
Subgroup average	*$2,705*	*4.5*	*91.5*	*15.8*	*42.7*
Group average ($N=36$)	*$2,202*	*3.8*	*78.7*	*17.4*	*42.9*
SD ($N=36$)	*$2,755*	*2.7*	*112.7*	*20.2*	*7.8*
World average ($N=161$)	*$13,529*	*0.7*	*99.7*	*11.9*	*40.9*

Data source
[a]World Bank (2010)
[b]CIA World Factbook (2011)

Table 26.6 Selected political indicators for failed and failing states rank ordered by failed state index scores, 2010 ($N=36$)

Countries	Year of independence	Type of polity 2010[a]	Head of state 2010[a]	Political freedom Index (−) 2010[b]	Civil liberties index (−) 2010[c]	Corruption perceptions index (+) 2009[d]	Global corruption barometer (−) 2010[e]	Failed state index (−) 2010[f]	Parliamentary seats held by women (+) 2010
Failed states (N=15)									
Somalia	1960	Republic	Executive	7.0	7.0	1.1	.	114.3	6.1
Chad	1960	Republic	Executive	7.0	6.0	1.6	.	113.3	5.2
Sudan	1956	Republic	Executive	7.0	7.0	1.5	.	111.8	18.1
Zimbabwe	1980	Republic	Executive	6.0	6.0	2.2	.	110.2	15.2
Congo, Dem Rep	1960	Republic	Executive	6.0	6.0	1.9	.	109.9	8.4
Afghanistan	1919	Republic	Executive	6.0	6.0	1.3	61	109.3	27.7
Iraq	1932	Republic	Ceremonial	5.0	6.0	1.5	56	107.3	25.5
Central African Rep	1960	Republic	Executive	5.0	5.0	2.0	.	106.4	10.5
Guinea	1958	Republic	Executive	7.0	6.0	1.8	.	105.0	19.3
Pakistan	1947	Republic	Executive	4.0	5.0	2.4	49	102.5	22.5
Haiti	1804	Republic	Executive	4.0	5.0	1.8	.	101.6	4.1
Cote D'Ivoire	1960	Republic	Executive	6.0	5.0	2.1	.	101.2	8.9
Kenya	1963	Republic	Executive	4.0	4.0	2.2	45	100.7	9.8
Nigeria	1960	Republic	Executive	5.0	4.0	2.5	63	100.2	7.0
Yemen	1967	Republic	Executive	6.0	5.0	2.1	.	100.0	0.3
Subgroup Average	***1946***	–	–	***5.7***	***5.5***	***1.9***	***54.8***	***106.2***	***12.6***
Subgroup median	***1960***	–	–	***6.0***	***6.0***	***1.9***	***56.0***	***106.4***	***9.8***
Failing states (N=21)									
Myanmar (Burma)	***1948***	***Republic***	***Executive***	***7.0***	***7.0***	***1.4***	.	***99.4***	***15.3***
Ethiopia	–	***Republic***	***Ceremonial***	***5.0***	***5.0***	***2.7***	.	***98.8***	***21.9***
Korea, North	***1948***	***Republic***	***Executive***	***7.0***	***7.0***	***3.5***	.	***97.8***	***15.6***
Niger	***1960***	***Republic***	***Executive***	***5.0***	***4.0***	***2.9***	.	***97.8***	***12.4***
Uganda	***1962***	***Republic***	***Executive***	***5.0***	***4.0***	***2.5***	***86***	***97.5***	***30.7***
Guinea -Bissau	***1973***	***Republic***	***Executive***	***4.0***	***4.0***	***1.9***	.	***97.2***	***10.0***
Burundi	***1962***	***Republic***	***Executive***	***4.0***	***5.0***	***1.8***	.	***96.7***	***30.5***
Bangladesh	***1971***	***Republic***	***Ceremonial***	***3.0***	***4.0***	***2.4***	.	***96.1***	***18.6***
Sri Lanka	1948	Republic	Executive	4.0	4.0	3.1	.	95.7	5.8
Nepal	1768	Republic	Ceremonial	4.0	4.0	2.3	.	95.4	33.2
Cameroon	1960	Republic	Executive	6.0	6.0	2.2	54	95.4	13.9
Malawi	1964	Republic	Executive	3.0	4.0	3.3	.	93.6	20.8
Sierra Leone	1961	Republic	Executive	3.0	3.0	2.2	71	93.6	13.2
Eritrea	1993	Republic	Executive	7.0	7.0	2.6	.	93.3	22.0
Congo, Rep	1960	Republic	Executive	6.0	5.0	1.9	.	92.5	7.3
Iran	1979	Republic	Executive	6.0	6.0	1.8	.	92.2	2.8
Liberia	1847	Republic	Executive	3.0	4.0	3.1	89	91.7	12.5
Lebanon	1943	Republic	Ceremonial	5.0	3.0	2.5	34	90.9	3.1
Burkina Faso	1960	Republic	Executive	5.0	3.0	3.6	.	90.7	15.3
Uzbekistan	1991	Republic	Executive	7.0	7.0	1.7	.	90.5	17.5
Georgia	1991	Republic	Executive	4.0	4.0	4.1	3	90.4	5.1
Subgroup average	***1949***	–		***4.9***	***4.8***	***2.5***	***56.2***	***94.6***	***15.6***

(continued)

Table 26.6 (continued)

Countries	Year of independence	Type of polity 2010[a]	Head of state 2010[a]	Political freedom Index (−) 2010[b]	Civil liberties index (−) 2010[c]	Corruption perceptions index (+) 2009[d]	Global corruption barometer (−) 2010[e]	Failed state index (−) 2010[f]	Parliamentary seats held by women (+) 2010
Subgroup median	***1961***	–	–	***5.0***	***4.0***	***2.5***	***62.5***	***95.4***	***15.3***
Group average (N=36)	***1948***	–	–	***5.2***	***5.1***	***2.3***	***55.5***	***99.5***	***14.3***
Group median (N=36)	***1960***	–	–	***5.0***	***5.0***	***2.2***	***56.0***	***97.8***	***13.6***
SD (N=36)	***328***	–	–	***1.3***	***1.3***	***0.7***	***28.9***	***7.0***	***8.6***
World average (N=161)	–	–	–	***3.6***	***3.5***	***7.5***	***25.0***	***35.3***	***16.8***

Sources
[a]Central Intelligence Agency (2010); Encyclopedia Britannica (2010)
[b]Freedom House (2010). Scores range for 1–7 with 1 representing the most free
[c]Freedom House (2010). Scores range for 1–7 with 1 representing the most free
[d]Transparency International (2009). The degree to which public sector corruption is perceived to exist in 178 countries worldwide
[e]Transparency International (2010). Percent users reporting they paid a bribe to receive attention from at least 1 of 9 different service providers
[f]United Nations Development Programme (2010)

"failed" states also are much lower than the world on average, albeit those of selected countries are more favorable, e.g., Nepal (33%), Uganda (31%), Burundi (31%), Afghanistan (28%), Iraq (26%), Pakistan (23%), and Ethiopia (22%).

The type of polity (e.g., Republic) and type of head of state (e.g., ceremonial vs. executive) of the FSs matter less to their development profile than does the commitment of the governments of the FSs to the promotion of individual freedoms and liberties. Countries can, for example, be organized as Republics, even engage in popular elections, and still maintain highly oppressive political systems that deny their citizens personal freedoms (e.g., Iran, Zimbabwe). The vast majority of "failed" states and many "failing" states fall precisely within the latter category.

Once again, the study's FSs, on average, performed more weakly on the political indicators than did the world-as-a-whole using the same set of indicators. The study's 36 FSs performed less favorably on all nine of the political indicators reported here than did the world-as-a-whole.

Central Government Expenditure Patterns

Central government expenditures (CGEs) represent public investments in sectors of perceived importance to the growth and development of societies; they also reflect the relative importance of each sector to one another. Thus, high public investments in the health and education sectors represent a society's commitment to human-capacity building or human-resource development whereas higher levels of expenditures for defense and military purposes typically occur in countries that are experiencing serious internal or external turmoil. Further, under free-market conditions, the proportion of the economy under the direct control of the central government will be lower compared with that accounted for by the private sector expenditures.

Table 26.7 summarizes patterns of CGE for "failed" and "failing" states ($N=36$); comparable data also are reported for the world-as-a-whole ($N = 161$). As reflected in the table, no significant differences were found between general government consumption levels as a percentage of GDP for 2008–2009 for the FSs relative to those observed for the larger community of nations, i.e., 34.3% for the FSs vs. 35.9% for the world-as-a-whole. The governments of "failed" states, however, accounted for a smaller share on average of total national economic expenditures (31.5%), albeit a small number of "failed" states were responsible for 35% or more of all national economic transactions, e.g., Iraq (87%), Yemen (51%), and Zimbabwe (44%). By comparison, the CGEs of six "failing" states accounted for more than one-third of the total expenditures of their

Table 26.7 Selected central government expenditure priorities of failed and failing states, 2010 ($N=36$)

Countries	General Gov't consumption as % GDP 2008–2009[a]	Public expenditures as % GDP			Military expenditures as % GDP 2008–2009[a]
		Education 2008–2009[b]	Health 2008–2009[b]	Debt-to-GDP 2008–2009	
Failed states (N = 15)					
Somalia	.	,	1.2	14.7	2.9
Chad	19.9	1.9	2.7	27.0	6.5
Sudan	.	6.0	1.3	105.1	4.2
Zimbabwe	43.7	4.6	4.1	282.6	2.3
Congo, Dem Rep	22.9	,	1.2	100.0	1.1
Afghanistan	9.2	,	1.8	23.0	1.9
Iraq	87.3	,	1.9	76.0	6.3
Central African Rep	.	1.4	1.4	68.0	1.8
Guinea	21.0	1.6	0.6	70.0	2.0
Pakistan	28.0	2.6	0.8	31.0	3.1
Haiti	16.4	1.4	1.2	7.0	0.0
Cote D'Ivoire	21.4	4.6	1.0	54.0	1.6
Kenya	33.6	6.9	2.0	24.0	1.9
Nigeria	24.1	0.9	1.7	6.0	0.9
Yemen	50.9	9.6	1.5	25.0	4.4
Subgroup average	***31.5***	***3.8***	***1.6***	***60.9***	***2.7***
Failing states (N = 21)					
Myanmar (Burma)	.	1.2	0.2	27.0	1.7
Ethiopia	.	6.0	2.2	13.0	1.4
Korea, North	.	,	3.0	6.1	29.0
Niger	.	3.4	2.8	79.0	1.2
Uganda	27.6	5.2	1.6	13.0	2.0
Guinea -Bissau	.	5.2	1.6	203.0	3.0
Burundi	39.1	5.1	5.2	202.0	3.8
Bangladesh	12.8	2.7	1.1	25.0	1.1
Sri Lanka	29.5	,	2.0	85.8	3.5
Nepal	26.3	3.4	2.0	36.0	1.6
Cameroon	19.1	3.3	1.3	13.0	1.6
Malawi	48.2	5.8	5.9	24.0	1.2
Sierra Leone	.	3.8	1.4	163.0	2.3
Eritrea	34.1	2.4	1.5	44.0	6.3
Congo, Rep	39.2	1.9	1.7	155.0	1.3
Iran	31.0	5.1	3.0	6.0	2.8
Liberia	.	,	2.8	606.0	1.0
Lebanon	43.7	2.7	3.9	154.8	4.1
Burkina Faso	27.7	4.2	3.4	23.0	1.3
Uzbekistan	85.6	9.4	2.3	11.0	0.5
Georgia	50.4	3.1	1.5	31.0	5.6
Subgroup average	***36.7***	***4.1***	***2.4***	***91.5***	***3.6***
Group average (N=36)	***34.3***	***4.0***	***2.1***	***78.7***	***3.3***
SD (N=36)	***22.1***	***2.5***	***1.2***	***111.2***	***4.7***
World average (N=161)	***35.9***	***4.5***	***3.6***	***99.7***	***2.4***

Data sources
[a]Central Intelligence Agency (2010); World Resources Institute (2010)
[b]World Bank (2010)

national economies, e.g., Uzbekistan (86%), Georgia (50%), Malawi (48%), Lebanon (44%), the Republic of the Congo (39%), and Burundi (39%).

Country debt-to-GDP levels are less dramatic for the FSs than for the world-as-a-whole, i.e., 78.7% vs. 99.9%. This may be due to the lack of credit worthiness of the FSs which depend more on multilateral foreign assistance to finance essential services. In some cases, the FSs debt-to-GDP levels well exceeded 100% of their total annual economic productivity, e.g., Liberia (606%), Zimbabwe (283%), Guinea-Bissau (203%), Burundi (202%), etc. These situations are especially problematic for already deeply impoverished nations.

CGEs for the health, education, and military sectors varied considerably by country. Overall, expenditures for the health sector (average = 2.1%) tended to be lower than expenditures for the education sector (average = 4.0%) whereas expenditures for the military sector (average = 3.3%) fell between those for the education and health sectors. Expenditures on all three sectors by the FSs were less favorable than those reported for the world-as-a-whole, i.e., health (average = 3.6%), education (average = 4.5%), and the military (average = 2.4%). Percent expenditures by sector varied for individual countries, of course, but the general pattern tends to remain more or less the same, i.e., higher investments in the education and health sectors and lower expenditures for the military (except in situations where the countries are engaged in active conflicts, e.g., Eritrea, Georgia, Iraq, North Korea).

Part 3: Failed States in Comparative Perspective

Failed states do not exist in a vacuum; instead, they are full members of the community of nations and, as such, enjoy all the rights and privileges that are extended to other sovereign states, including membership in the United Nations and other important world bodies. "Failed" and "failing" states help to establish the policy agenda for the world community and, frequently, despite their relative poverty, contribute resources to carrying out various types of global initiatives, e.g., through participation in regional peace-keeping efforts, disaster relief efforts, and serving as places of initial settlement for refugees from neighboring states. Owing to their overall structural weaknesses, however, the FSs more typically are the beneficiaries of world generosity and, as with the United Nations *Millennium Development Campaign*, receive substantial amounts of international aid on a preferential basis (United Nations 2010a, b, c, d). In extending international largesse in this way, the larger community of nations seeks to help the FSs overcome at least some of the most important obstacles to their development. Aid-giving nations, however, tend to avoid becoming mired down by the intricacies of the local politics of recipient countries although appreciable investments are made by aid-giving countries in helping the FSs: (1) improve their levels of political transparency, (2) create political space for the development of a viable civil society, and (3) develop more participatory political systems (MDC 2011; Transparency International 2010). Indeed, many of the world's largest aid-giving bodies condition their grant-making activities on the basis of such criteria, e.g., the *Millennium Development Account* approach to international development promulgated by President George W. Bush of the United States (MDC 2011), the Development and Cooperation programs of the European Union (Europa 2011), as well as the United Nations' *Millennium Development Campaign* (United Nations 2005, 2010a, b, c, d). Thus, aid-receiving FSs experience considerable pressure in realigning their political systems in a manner more consistent with world norms.

Figures 26.5 and 26.6 summarize social development trends measured on the WISP for the FSs for the years 1990, 2000, and 2010 vis-à-vis those of four other development groupings, i.e., Development Market Economies (DMEs, $N=34$), the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS, $N=19$), Developing Countries (DCs, $N=54$), and Least Developing Countries (LDCs, $N=19$).

As a group, the FSs fared less well on the WISP than other groupings of nations, in most cases substantially so, including of the group of 19 non-FSs classified by the United Nations as "Least Developing" countries. Though the scores of the last two groups do more closely approximate one another, in reality, the group of FSs are far more fragile than are the LDCs, especially for the period 1990–2000.

The good news for the FSs is that their aggregate WISP scores increased by an average of 140% between 2000 and 2010 – one of the highest rates of increase ever reported for a group of related nations on the WISP. The impressive strength of the changes in these aggregate scores suggests that, between 2000 and 2010, many of the FSs were beginning to introduce greater political stability and higher levels of public performance into their



Fig. 26.5 Average WISP scores by development groupings, 1990–2010 ($N = 162$)



Fig. 26.6 Percent change in average WISP scores for developmental groupings, 1990–2010 ($N = 162$)

development profiles (Colletta et al. 2004; Helman and Ratner 1992/1993; Meierhenrich 2004).

The FSs that made the most substantial gains on the WISP between 2000 and 2010 included Malawi (+36 ranks); Ethiopia (+ 27 ranks); Bangladesh (+ 27 ranks); Niger (+12 ranks); Uganda (+12 ranks); Nepal (+11 ranks); Burundi (+11 ranks); Eritrea (+9 ranks); Yemen (+5 ranks); Korea, North (+5 ranks); and Afghanistan (+1 rank). Three additional FSs retained their WISP rank positions for both 2000 and 2010, i.e., Central African Republic, Guinea-Bissau, and Sierra Leone (Table 26.8).

Eighteen of the FSs lost significant social ground on the WISP between 1990 and 2000 and, again, between 2000 and 2010 (Table 26.8). The WISP rank losses experienced by both FSs groups over the two time intervals were especially severe for the group of "failed states" (an average of −38.4 WISP rank position losses between 1990 and 2000 and an additional average loss of −7.4 WISP rank positions between

Table 26.8 WISP scores and WISP rank positions for failed states rank ordered by 2010 failed states index (FSI), 1990, 2000 and 2010 (*N*=36)

Countries	WISP 1990 (base=124)	WISP 2000 (base=163)	WISP 2010 (base=163)	WISP90 rank (base=124)	WISP00 rank (base=163)	WISP10 rank (base=163)	Change in WISP rank positions 1990>2000	Change in WISP rank positions 2000>2010
Failing states (N = 15)								
Somalia	1	1	17	119	153	161	–34	–8
Chad	–2	–4	26	121	155	156	–34	–1
Sudan	13	13	35	105	137	142	–32	–5
Zimbabwe	37	24	37	76	120	136	–44	–16
Congo, Dem Rep	14	–2	26	103	154	157	–51	–3
Afghanistan	3	–19	17	116	163	162	–47	1
Iraq	35	28	28	80	116	154	–36	–38
Central African Rep	9	2	32	111	152	152	–41	0
Guinea	–1	5	32	120	148	151	–28	–3
Pakistan	24	23	39	88	121	127	–33	–6
Haiti	28	23	33	83	121	150	–38	–29
Cote D'Ivoire	16	12	35	99	141	145	–42	–4
Kenya	24	12	35	90	141	144	–51	–3
Nigeria	11	14	37	110	134	137	–24	–3
Yemen	.	8	35	.	146	141	.	5
Subgroup Averages	***15.2***	***9.4***	***30.9***	***101.5***	***140.3***	***147.7***	***–38.4***	***–7.4***
Failing states (N=21)								
Myanmar (Burma)	36	35	41	78	109	119	–31	–10
Ethiopia	–10	–12	38	124	161	134	–37	27
Korea, North	47	35	45	66	109	104	–43	5
Niger	3	–4	35	117	155	143	–38	12
Uganda	12	7	37	107	147	135	–40	12
Guinea -Bissau	.	–4	27	.	155	155	.	0
Burundi	18	3	36	95	150	139	–55	11
Bangladesh	19	32	48	94	114	87	–20	27
Sri Lanka	57	53	46	49	74	100	–25	–26
Nepal	17	22	43	97	123	112	–26	11
Cameroon	21	15	36	92	133	138	–41	–5
Malawi	13	9	43	104	145	109	–41	36
Sierra Leone	2	–10	25	118	159	159	–41	0
Eritrea	.	–15	29	.	162	153	.	9
Congo, Rep	27	22	36	86	123	140	–37	–17
Iran	45	46	47	69	90	89	–21	1
Liberia	12	–6	24	109	158	160	–49	–2
Lebanon	45	52	52	68	78	61	–10	17
Burkina Faso	8	3	40	113	150	125	–37	25
Uzbekistan	.	52	52	.	78	62	.	16
Georgia	.	63	51	.	54	68	.	–14
Subgroup averages	***21.9***	***19.0***	***39.6***	***93.3***	***125.2***	***118.7***	***–33.7***	***6.1***
Group averages (N=36)	***18.8***	***15.0***	***36.0***	***97.0***	***131.5***	***130.8***	***–36.5***	***0.8***
SD (N=36)	***16.3***	***20.9***	***8.8***	***19.2***	***28.3***	***28.6***	***10.0***	***15.7***
World averages (N=161)	***48.1***	***48.5***	***48.7***	***62.0***	***80.5***	***80.5***	***0.0***	***0.0***

Source: Estes (2010)

2000 and 2010). WISP rank losses for the group of 21 "failing states" were only slightly lower.

Obviously, both subgroups of countries are in considerable turmoil concerning their political futures with the exception of the 11 countries for which substantial improvements in their WISP rank positions were reported. The situation for the three states for which no changes in either direction occurred (Central African Republic, Guinea-Bissau, and Sierra Leone) could move in either direction, but as of now, they are succeeding in not losing the precious social gains achieved during earlier development decades.

Part 4: Working Toward a More Positive Future for Collapsed, "Failed," and "Failing" States: A Global Agenda for Action

State failure is not inevitable, even for the poorest and most resource-deprived countries. But state failures do occur, and the challenges involved in bringing them back from collapse are complex and will not easily yield to ready-made solutions. As illustrated in the discussion throughout this chapter, each nation must find its own approach to rebuilding itself – one that builds on its history and, at the same time, propels the nation forward. Fortunately, there exists a range of tools for helping collapsed, failed, and failing states regain their capacity to perform as functioning polities in providing for the security and material needs of their inhabitants (Ghani and Lockhart 2008; Lyons 2004; Meierhenrich 2004; Posner 2004; Rose-Ackerman 2004; Snodgrass 2004; Widner 2004).

General Considerations

A general approach to rebuilding "failed" and "failing" states has a number of components.

1. Nations first must recognize that they have arrived at a crisis point where, without concerted effort, only further deterioration is likely.
   (a) Recognition of being on the brink of social implosion is not easily achieved, especially if the society's elites continue to benefit from the existing social order even as the quality of life of most of the nation's inhabitants declines (e.g., Burundi, Chad, Haiti, Tajikistan).
   (b) Recent revolutionary events in the Middle East and Africa – e.g., Egypt, Iraq, Libya, Tunisia, Yemen (CNN 2011), as well as the past failures of the Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman, and Russian empires, are illustrative of the conflict associated with the denial of state failure by authoritarian regimes.
   (c) Typically, a major national, often regional, crisis prompts the country's leaders to recognize its crisis situation, e.g., the collapse of major markets, unsustainable levels of unemployment, widespread strikes, street protests or riots, criticism of the country leadership by its own citizens and by major international NGOs, or condemnatory resolutions taken by the United Nations Security Council.
   (d) Each of these actions forces the country's leaders to recognize that the status quo is no longer working and that new approaches to state performance must be found.
2. Once the reality of state failure has been recognized, then, leaders within the failed or failing states must attempt to understand the underlying causes of the failure.
   (a) Always difficult to discern, such causes may include the geographic makeup of the nation, problems with accessing locally available natural and human resources, public corruption, high levels of public indebtedness, intolerable levels of diversity-related social conflict, and, typically, years of incompetent public leadership.
   (b) Such an assessment must be systematic and, to the fullest extent possible, involve all sectors of society in the assessment process, including representatives of the people and peoples' organizations.
3. Typically, new national leadership will be identified or will emerge as part of the assessment process. The new leadership may come from all areas of public life but, ideally, will include a mix of persons with significant political, economic, and related experience.
4. Having identified the mix of factors that undermine the current and future integrity of the state, the nation's new leaders must identify *a range of options* that are available to them in responding to the crisis.
   (a) Such options take the form of "scenario" development, i.e., the framing of alternative futures that the nation may wish to achieve for itself.

(b) National scenario development can be an exceedingly complex process and, in every case, is time and resource consuming and requires the involvement of a large number of societal stakeholders.
(c) Almost always, the process of scenario development involves the utilization of internal and external resources, some of which are people-centered, but others draw from the nation's natural resource reserves.

5. Central to the process of national scenario development is the engagement of the most experienced and best educated members of society in a series of carefully thought through efforts directed at reversing the country's downward spiral.
   (a) Such people are found in virtually every society, but engaging them productively in the rebuilding process will require the country's elites to enlarge their power base to include such persons.
   (b) Important stakeholders in a country's reconstruction process also may be available from outside of country, especially among those who have played important roles in the country's past social and economic development, including trading partners.
   (c) These persons also may include senior members of major international nongovernmental organizations who are intimately familiar with the history of the country and its current development priorities.
6. National scenario development also will require the identification of monetary and other assets that draw on the nation's internal resource base, e.g., its geographic location, natural and human capital resources, network of relationships with neighboring states and international trading partners, and other types of physical, fiscal, social, and cultural capital.
7. Failed and failing states also must draw on the resources of the international community in their rebuilding efforts. These resources include:
   (a) Technical assistance from multilateral development assistance organizations, sustained foreign aid over at least the near term, and the adoption of approaches to development that have demonstrated their effectiveness in other more or less comparable situations
   (b) The development experiences of other countries that have undergone similar types of transitions in the recent past
8. Failed and failing states also must enter into mutually beneficial partnerships with other nations. These partnerships are important for two reasons:
   (a) To strengthen the internal capacity of the failed and failing states
   (b) To avail failed and failing states of the positive experiences of their partner states
9. And, finally, the ideal situation is for such national rebuilding partnerships to be formed between the FSs and other nations of the South (vs. former colonizing powers whose motives for engagement may be suspect). The reasons for these types of relationships also are twofold:
   (a) The past experiences at nation-building of the world's already socially advanced countries may not be reflective of the development needs of failed or failing states.
   (b) The promotion of effective South-South relationships is a worthwhile goal in and of itself.

At a minimum, monetary assistance is needed from economically and socially advanced nations to finance the South-South partnerships which, by their nature, are fraught with economic challenges. Such assistance may take the form of grants-in-aid, favorable trading practices, reduced import tariffs, and the like. They also may take the form of bi- or multilateral technical assistance programs that draw on the expertise of people with a broad range of practical and theoretical skills, i.e., from experienced farmers and skilled craftspersons to former and current statespersons.

This general approach to reestablishing the nation-building capacity of failed and failing states reflects a "strengths approach" to social and economic development. The approach draws substantially on both the internal resource base of the FSs themselves and, at the same time, is premised on active engagement of FSs in strong working partnerships with international nongovernmental organizations and other countries of the South. The approach also recognizes that respect for the social histories, traditions, and values of the failing states is part of the rebuilding formula … as is a full understanding of the contemporary social, political, and economic challenges that confront them.

Conclusions

This chapter began by questioning the extent to which advances in quality of life were possible under conditions of extreme political and economic collapse.

"Failed" and "failing" states (FSs) identified by the Fund for Peace were used as the basis for exploring this question. Data from the Fund's *Failed States Index* (FSI) were supplemented with time-series data obtained from the author's own statistically weighted *Index of Social Progress* (WISP). The latter index used social indicator data covering the 20-year period 1990–2010. Where appropriate, additional literature and statistical resources were added to the information database in order to arrive at the clearest possible picture of the dynamics of socio-political development under the most adverse conditions confronting humanity. A number of critical findings emerged from this analysis.

1. For the majority of "failed" and "failing" states, the process of entropy is so strong that nothing may be possible to halt their eventual social implosion. The pursuit of quality of life in such situations, in a Shakespearean sense (Wells 1986), is illusionary at best and, when it does occur, is possible only for individuals who are able to isolate themselves from the crises by which they are surrounded, i.e., self-contained communities that do not depend on the larger society for their collective well-being.
   (a) This was the model that insulated European religious communities from the turmoil of the Reformation during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, i.e., beginning in 1517 with the publication of Martin Luther's *The Ninety-Five Theses* that established Protestantism in what, until then, was exclusively Catholic Europe to the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 which gave the West its current system of sovereign nation-states (devoid of papal control) that ended the continent's centuries-long religious wars.
   (b) This also is the model adopted by medieval Japan (1635–1868) and contemporary China (1949–1978) when they voluntarily closed themselves off from the outside world in order to consolidate their social identities.
2. The attainment of increased levels of quality of life under conditions of profound social deterioration also may occur for individuals in possession of sufficient material resources that make it possible for them to remove themselves from the immediate consequences of national social collapse, e.g., those who can retreat to "country estates" or immigrate to other countries.
3. Most inhabitants of "failed" and "failing" states, however, cannot and do not participate in either of the above situations and, therefore, experience considerable emotional and, often, physical dislocations as states unravel and cease to perform their core functions.
4. Personal and collective social deterioration are especially problematic when people are forced to live well below subsistence levels or in situations in which they are forced to participate in barbarous acts of aggression toward their neighbors, or both.

Thus, social development requires peace, or at least minimum levels of positive social, political, and economic stability. War, conflict, and other serious threats to individual and collective security make it impossible for the vast majority of the inhabitants of a country to pursue the fullest possible realization of their potential. On this issue, Plato (428–348 BCE) was correct in stating in *The Republic* that "justice" (and, in turn, "happiness" [and "pleasure"]) is not only desirable for its own sake but also maximized among those who pursue it (Plato 2000). Both Plato and his student, Aristotle (384–322 BCE), emphasized the critical role of the state in removing the "barriers" to the pursuit of happiness, but both argued that the state itself could not guarantee or be held accountable for the happiness of individuals. Confucius (551–479 BCE), writing more than a century earlier, proposed that "harmony" (and, by inference, "collective happiness") was the end goal of society and could be attained only through well-ordered social hierarchies. He carefully identified the structure of these hierarchies and delineated the societal problems that would occur if the prescribed norms were not followed. Unlike Plato and Aristotle, Confucius dismissed the pursuit of individual happiness as a central concern of societies (or even of individuals) and focused, instead, on the role of the state in providing for the needs of larger collectivities. Confucian approaches to collective harmony and structured social relationships continue to inform the social contracts that exist between citizens and their governments throughout much of Northeast Asia today (Van Norden 2001).

As evidenced by the data reported in this chapter, the attainment of personal or collective happiness is not possible for the vast majority of inhabitants of collapsed or collapsing societies. Such states simply do not possess the minimum conditions required for positive social development over time. And, not only do failed and failing states severely impede the personal and collective quality of life of their own inhabitants, they also threaten that of their neighboring states. Viewed from an even larger perspective, the collapse

of failed and failing states also threatens the quality of life of the larger world community which, increasingly, is called upon to intervene in the myriad crises created by state failures.

Acknowledgement Zhou Huiquan (Mary) of the Chinese University of Hong Kong is acknowledged for her research assistance in updating the statistics contained in this chapter.

References

African Development Bank. (2010). *African economic outlook, 2010*. From http://www.afdb.org/en/knowledge/publications/african-economic-outlook/. Retrieved October 17, 2010.

Amnesty International. (2010). *The state of the world's human rights, 2010*. From http://thereport.amnesty.org/. Retrieved October 10, 2010.

Anheier, H., Toepler, S., & List, R. (Eds.). (2010). *International encyclopedia of civil society*. New York: Springer.

Annas, J. (1993). *The morality of happiness*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Asian Development Bank (ADB). (2010). *Asian development outlook, 2010: Macroeconomic management beyond the crisis*. From http://www.adb.org/documents/books/ado/2010/. Retrieved October 25, 2010.

Bates, R. H. (2008). *When things fell apart: State failure in late-century Africa*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Britannica Online. (2011a). *Supranational political powers*. From http://proxy.library.upenn.edu:7116/EBchecked/topic/467746/political-system/36702/National-political-systems?anchor=ref416908. Retrieved February 20, 2011.

Britannica Online (2011b). *Peace of Westphalia*. From http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/641170/Peace-of-Westphalia. Retrieved February 20, 2011.

Carment, D. (2004). Preventing state failure. In R. I. Rotberg (Ed.), *When states fail: Causes and consequences* (pp. 135–150). Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Central Intelligence Agency. (2010). *World factbook*. From http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/. Retrieved February 11, 2011.

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). (2011). *World Factbook, 2011*. From http://search.yahoo.com/search?fr=mcafee&p=cia+world+factbook+2011. Retrieved August 30, 2011.

Chomsky, N. (2006). *"Failed" states: The abuse of power and the assault on democracy*. New York: Holt.

Clapham, C. (2004). The global-local politics of state decay. In R. I. Rotberg (Ed.), *When states fail: Causes and consequences* (pp. 77–93). Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Club of Rome. (2011). *Publications*. From http://www.clubofrome.org/eng/featured_publications_bank/. Retrieved February 20, 2011.

CNN (2011). *Unrest in the middle east and Africa: Country by country. February 26*. From http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/meast/02/25/mideast.africa.unrest/index.html?iref=allsearch. Retrieved March 1, 2011.

Colletta, N. J., Kostner, M., & Wiederhofer, I. (2004). Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration: Lessons and liabilities in reconstruction. In R. I. Rotberg (Ed.), *When states fail: Causes and consequences* (pp. 170–181). Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Encyclopedia Britannica. (2010). Britannica On-line. From http://www.britannica.com/. Retrieved February 20, 2011.

Estes, R. J. (1988). *Trends in world social development*. Westport: Praeger Publishers.

Estes, R. J. (1995). Social development trends in Africa: The need for a new development paradigm. *Social Development Issues, 17*(1), 18–47.

Estes, R. J. (2007). Asia and the new century: Challenges and opportunities. *Social Indicators Research, 82*(3), 375–410.

Estes, R. J. (2010). The world social situation: Development challenges at the outset of a new century. *Social Indicators Research, 98*(3), 363–402.

Estes, R. J. (2011a). Development trends among the world's socially least developed countries: Reasons for guarded optimism. *Globalization and Its Challenges*, In Spooner, B. (Ed.), Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press), in press.

Estes, R. J. (2011b). Economies in transition. In A. Michalos & K. Land (Eds.), *Handbook of quality of life research*. Dordrecht: Springer, in press.

Europa. (2011). *Development and cooperation*. From http://europa.eu/pol/dev/index_en.htm. Retrieved February 17, 2011.

Freedom House. (2010). *Freedom in the world, 2010*. From http://www.freedomhouse.org/. Retrieved February 11, 2011.

Fund for Peace. (2011a). *The "failed" states index: Postcards from hell*. The sixth annual collaboration between *Foreign Policy* magazine and *The Fund for Peace*. From http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/06/21/2010_failed_states_index_interactive_map_and_rankings. Retrieved February 12, 2011.

Fund for Peace. (2011b). *"Failed" states index scores*. Foreign Policy & the Fund for Peace. From http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=229&Itemid=366. Retrieved February 13, 2011.

Fund for Peace. (2011c). *Methodology behind CAST*. From http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=107&Itemid=145. Retrieved February 13, 2011.

Ghani, A., & Lockhart, C. (2008). *Fixing "failed" states: A framework for rebuilding a fractured world*. New York and London: Oxford University Press.

Glennie, J. (2008). *The trouble with aid: Why less could mean more for Africa*. London: Zed Books.

Helman, G. B. & Ratner, S. R. (1992/1993). *Saving "failed" states. Foreign Policy, 89*. From http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/06/21/saving_failed_states. Retrieved February 12, 2011.

Human Rights Watch. (2010). *Defending Human Rights Worldwide*. Retrieved March 17, 2011 from http://www.hrw.org/

Human Rights Watch. (2011). *World report, 2011*. From http://www.hrw.org/en/world-report-2011. Retrieved February 20, 2011.

Huntington, S. P. (1996). *The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order*. New York: Simon & Shuster.

International Monetary Fund (IMF). (2010). *World Economic Recovery*. Retrieved April 15, 2011 from http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2010/02/index.htm

International Monetary Fund (IMF). (2010a). *World economic outlook, 2010*. Washington: International Monetary Fund.

International Monetary Fund (IMF). (2010b). *Debt relief under the heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC) Initiative*. From http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/hipc.htm. Retrieved February 16, 2011.

Kasfir, N. (2004). Domestic anarchy, security dilemmas, and violent predation: Causes of failure. In R. I. Rotberg (Ed.), *When states fail: Causes and consequences* (pp. 53–76). Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Kim, K. S., Lee, Y. W., & Lee, Y. J. (2010). A multilevel analysis of factors related to poverty in welfare states. *Social Indicators Research, 99*(3), 391–404.

Klare, M. T. (2004). The deadly connection: Paramilitary bands, small arms diffusion, and state failure. In R. I. Rotberg (Ed.), *When states fail: Causes and consequences* (pp. 116–134). Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Leonard, D., & Straus, S. (2003). *Africa's stalled development*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

Lyons, T. (2004). Transforming the institutions of war: Post-conflict elections and the reconstruction of "failed" states. In R. I. Rotberg (Ed.), *When states fail: Causes and consequences* (pp. 269–301). Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Mallaby, S. (2004). *The world's banker: A story of "failed" states, financial crises, and the wealth and poverty of nations*. New York: Penguin.

Meierhenrich, J. (2004). Forming states after failure. In R. I. Rotberg (Ed.), *When states fail: Causes and consequences* (pp. 153–169). Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Michalos, A. C. (2011). The good life: Eighth century to the third century BCE. Chapter 1 in the current Handbook.

Millennium Development Corporation (MDC). (2011). *The millennium challenge campaign*. From http://www.mcc.gov/. Retrieved February 17, 2011.

Moran, M., Rein, M., & Goodin, R. (Eds.). (2006). *The Oxford handbook of public policy*. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Moyo, D. (2009). *Dead aid: Why aid is not working and how there is a better way for Africa*. New York: Farrar, Straus, & Giroux.

Obioma, I. (2001). *Contending issues in African development: Advances, challenges, and the future*. London: Greenwood Press.

Plato (2000). The republic. In Ferrari, G. (Ed.), Translated by Griffith, T. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Posner, D. N. (2004). Civil society and the reconstruction of "failed" states. In R. I. Rotberg (Ed.), *When states fail: Causes and consequences* (pp. 237–255). Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Rose-Ackerman, R. (2004). Establishing the rule of law. In R. I. Rotberg (Ed.), *When states fail: Causes and consequences* (pp. 182–221). Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Rotberg, R. I. (2003). *State failure and state weakness in a time of terror*. Cambridge: World Peace Foundation.

Rotberg, R. I. (2004). The failure and collapse of nation-states: Breakdown, prevention, and repair. In R. I. Rotberg (Ed.), *When states fail: Causes and consequences* (pp. 1–50). Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Sach, J. (2008). *Common Wealth: Economics for a Crowded Planet*. New York: Penguin Press.

Sachs, J. D. (2005). *The end of poverty*. New York: Penguin Press.

Save the World's Children. (2010). *The state of the world's mothers, 2010*. From http://www.savethechildren.net/alliance/what_we_do/every_one/news.html. Retrieved February 14, 2011.

Schyns, P., & Koop, C. (2010). Political distrust and social capital in Europe and the USA. *Social Indicators Research, 96*(1), 145–167.

Sen, A. (1999). *Development as freedom*. New York: Knopf.

Snodgrass, D. R. (2004). Restoring economic functioning in "failed" states. In R. I. Rotberg (Ed.), *When states fail: Causes and consequences* (pp. 256–268). Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Stockholm International Peace and Research Institute. (2009). *SIPRI yearbook, 2009: Armaments, disarmament and international security*. Stockholm: SIPRI.

Transparency International (TI) (2009). *CPI Survey and Indices*. Retrieved February 1, 2011 from http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2009

Transparency International. (2010). *Global corruption report, 2010*. From http://www.transparency.org/publications/gcr. Retrieved February 11, 2011.

Tsai, M. C. (2006). Macro-structural determinants of political freedom in developing countries: A cross-national analysis. *Social Indicators Research, 76*(2), 317–340.

Tsai, M. C. (2007). Does globalization affect human well-being? *Social Indicators Research, 81*(1), 103–126.

Tsai, C. L., Hung, M. C., & Harriott, K. (2010). Human capital composition and economic growth. *Social Indicators Research, 99*(1), 41–59.

United Nations. (2005). World Summit, 2005. Retrieved April 1, 2011 from http://www.globalissues.org/article/559/united-nations-world-summit-2005

United Nations. (2010a). *The millennium development goals report, 2010*. From http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/pdf/MDG%20Report%202010%20En%20r15%20-low%20res%2020100615%20-.pdf. Retrieved January 31, 2011.

United Nations. (2010b). *Millennium development goals: 2010 progress chart*. From http://unstats.un.org/unsd/mdg/Resources/Static/Products/Progress2010/MDG_Report_2010_Progress_Chart_En.pdf. Retrieved January 31, 2011.

United Nations. (2010c). *Summit on the millennium development goals: Reports*. From http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/reports.shtml. Retrieved January 31, 2011.

United Nations. (2010d). *Keeping the promise: United to achieve the millennium development goals: Outcome document*. From http://www.un.org/en/mdg/summit2010/pdf/mdg%20outcome%20document.pdf. Retrieved January 31, 2011.

United Nations (2011). *Member states of the United Nations*. From http://www.un.org/en/members/index.shtml. Retrieved February 14, 2011.

United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) (2010a). *The state of the world's children, 2010*. http://www.unicef.org/rightsite/sowc/pdfs/SOWC_Spec%20Ed_CRC_Main%20Report_EN_090409.pdf. Retrieved January 31, 2011.

United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF). (2010b). *Progress for children: Achieving the MDGs with equity (No. 9)*. From http://www.unicef.org/publications/index_55740.html. Retrieved February 12, 2011.

United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM). (2010). *Progress of the world's women, 2010/2011*. From http://acelebrationofwomen.org/?p=24595. Retrieved January 28, 2011.

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). (2010). *Human development report, 2010: The real wealth of nations: Pathways to human development*. From http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2010/. Retrieved February 2, 2011.

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). (2009a). *UNHCR statistical yearbook*. From http://www.unhcr.org/pages/4a02afce6.html. Retrieved October 10, 2010.

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). (2009b). *MDGs and refugees*. From http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e5a9e56.html. Retrieved October 10, 2010.

United Nations Office of the High Representative for Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries, and Small Island Developing Countries (UN-OHRLLS) (2009a). The criteria for LDCs. From http://www.un.org/special-rep/ohrlls/ldc/ldc%20criteria.htm. Retrieved 13 Oct 2010.

United Nations Office of the High Representative for Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries, and Small Island Developing Countries (UN-OHRLLS) (2009b). List of LDCs. From http://www.unohrlls.org/en/ldc/related/62/. Retrieved 13 Oct 2010.

United Nations Office of the High Representative for Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries, and Small Island Developing Countries (UN-OHRLLS) (2009c). LDC facts and figures. From http://www.unohrlls.org/en/ldc/related/63/. Retrieved 13 Oct 2010.

United Nations Office of the High Representative for Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries, and Small Island Developing Countries (UN-OHRLLS) (2009d). Resolutions. From http://www.un.org/special-rep/ohrlls/ldc/resolutions.htm. Retrieved 13 Oct 2010.

United Nations Population Division (UNPOP) (2010). World population prospects: 2008 Revisions. From http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/wpp2008/wpp2008_highlights.pdf. Retrieved 13 Oct 2010.

Van de Walle, N. (2004). The economic correlates of state failure: Taxes, foreign aid, and policies. In R. I. Rotberg (Ed.), *When states fail: Causes and consequences* (pp. 94–115). Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Van Norden, B. W. (Ed.). (2001). *Confucius and the analects: New essays*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Weingast, B. R., & Wittman, D. A. (Eds.). (2006). *The Oxford handbook of political economy*. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Wells, R. H. (1986). *Shakespeare, politics, and the state*. London: Macmillan and Company.

Widner, J. A. (2004). Building effective trust in the aftermath of severe conflict. In R. I. Rotberg (Ed.), *When states fail: Causes and consequences* (pp. 222–236). Princeton: Princeton University Press.

World Bank (2009). The enhanced heavily indebted poor countries initiative. From http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTDEBTDEPT/0,,contentMDK:20260411~menuPK:528655~pagePK:64166689~piPK:64166646~theSitePK:469043,00.html. Retrieved 10 Jan 2011.

World Bank. (2010). *World Bank Development Indicators, 2010*. From data.worldbank.org/.../world-development-indicators/wdi-2010.

World Bank. (2011). *World development report, 2011: Overcoming conflict and fragility*. New York: Oxford University Press.

World Resources Institute (WRI). (2008). *World resources: Roots of resilience*. Washington: World Resources Institute.

World Resources Institute (WRI). (2010). *World Resources Report, 2009*: Environmental Report. From http://pdf.wri.org/environmentalindicators_bw.pdf. Retrieved August 15, 2011.

Yunus, M., & Weber, K. (2008). *Creating a world without poverty: Social business and the future of capitalism*. New York: Public Affairs.

Zartman, I. W. (Ed.). (1995). *Collapsed states: The disintegration and restoration of legitimate authority*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.